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ABSTRACT 
It has long been realised that factor accumulation and technological 
development are only proximate causes of economic development, and focus 
has now shifted to investigating the ‘deeper determinants’ of economic growth. 
Two such forces are highlighted in literature: institutions and geography. 
However, it remains controversial as to which of these two is the more 
important. The “Institutions school” assigns primal importance to institutions, 
whereas the “Geography school” considers geographical factors as the primary 
determinant of economic performance of countries. This paper reviews the 
debate surrounding these “deeper determinants” of economic performance. It 
reviews the work of these two schools of thought and their interpretation of the 
long-run development. The paper then examines the evidence provided by the 
respective schools in favour of their hypotheses. It concludes in favour of the 
Institutions hypothesis as the Geography school does not provide a consistent 
story of long-run development. 
 
JEL classification:  O10, O43, N00, P51, R11 
Keywords: Institutions, Geography, Long-run Development, Deeper 
Determinants of Growth 
 

 
 
 
 
Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does 
not enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel 
themselves secure in the possession of their property, in which the faith of 
contract is not supported by law… 
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (V, iii) (1776) 
 
 
As by means of water-carriage a more extensive market is opened to every sort 
of industry than what land-carriage alone can afford it, so it is upon sea-coast, 
and along the banks of navigable rivers, that industry of every kind naturally 
begins to subdivide and improve itself… 
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (I, iii) (1776) 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The world income is very unevenly distributed across countries. While 
the average annual income of one billion people living in high income 
economies is about $27000 that of 2.5 billion people living in low income 
economies is a mere  $430 [World Bank (2004)]. To understand the gravity of 
the situation one just has to look at the per capita income of the world’s richest 
country (Luxembourg $56000) vis-à-vis that of poorest (Burundi $90).1  
Madison (1995) estimates that Africa was able to achieve levels of income in 
1992 what Europe had achieved more than hundred and seventy years ago.2 
What explains these phenomenal differences in economic performance? 
Until recently, economists had conveniently attributed it to the process of capital 
accumulation and technological development, in line with the predictions of 
neoclassical growth theory.3 Indeed, it was the dominant paradigm in the post 
world war II era when many newly independent countries were aspiring to join 
the league of developed countries. Massive injection of capital (both in the form 
of foreign aid and loan) was sought to free these lagging countries from resource 
constraint and speed up the process of capital accumulation, and hence foster 
                                                                          
Acknowledgements: The author wishes to thank Dr Nadeem Ul Haque and Dr Musleh-ud 
Din for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Any remaining errors and 
omissions are the author’s sole responsibility. 
1World Development Indicators (2005). 
2In 1992, the average per capita income in Africa was estimated to be $1284 (international 
$), which is comparable to per capita income in Europe (1292 international dollars) in 1820. 
3Along with its endogenous growth variant. The endogenous growth variant of neoclassical 
theory [Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988)] brings in the important role of innovation. 
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growth. We all know by now that growth did not happen for a large number of 
countries. 
 Moreover, the theory was unable to provide explanation for some basic 
question as to why some countries accumulate more capital (and hence grow 
faster then others), while some fail to utilise available capital effectively. North 
and Thomas (1973) write, “if all that is required for economic growth is 
investment and innovation, why have some societies missed this desirable 
outcome?” They further write, “the factors we have listed (innovation, 
economies of scale, education, capital accumulation etc.) are not causes of 
growth; they are growth”.4 
So, now capital accumulation and productivity growth are considered as 
“proximate” causes only, and the focus has shifted to investigating “deeper 
determinants” of growth.5 What are these “deeper determinants”? Literature 
highlights two such candidates: one is geography and the other is institutions of 
the society. Though, there is consensus about the determinants, there is not 
much agreement about which one of these is more important. The “institutions 
school” argues for institutions as the fundamental cause, while the “geography 
school” considers geography as the primary determinant. 
Adam Smith (1774), in writing about causes of wealth of nations, had 
stressed both. In fact, his two quotes at the beginning of this paper have become 
the most cited quotes.6 The first one points to the importance of organising 
principles of a society in achieving prosperity (through commerce and 
manufactures) and the second quote identifies its geographical correlates, i.e., 
where we can expect this activity to be located. 
Consequently, a debate has ensued which remains inconclusive till today. 
Proponents of geography hypothesis claim that “geography determines” the 
growth prospects of a country, where as advocates of institutions hypothesis 
argue that “institutions rule”.7 While the two schools fight it out among 
themselves, we will try to give a comprehensive review of this debate. 
The structure of paper is as follows. In the next two sections we will 
review the two schools of thought; their theoretical foundations, linkages with 
growth, and empirical evidence provided in support of their arguments. Section 
two reviews the geography school and the third section discusses the institutions 
school. The fourth section is devoted to the debate and the final section 
concludes. 
2. GEOGRAPHY AS DESTINY 
                                                                          
4According to them growth will not happen if existing economic organisation is not 
efficient.  
5See Rodrik, et al. (2002) and Easterly and Levine (2003). Also see, Bloch and Tang (2004), 
Przeworski (2004), and Woods (2004) for review of some of the issues. 
6These quotes have been used extensively by respective schools. 
7Phrases like “geography determines” and “institutions rule” have become very popular in 
this debate. 
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All the inland parts of Africa, and all that part of Asia which lies any 
considerable way north of the Euxine and Caspian seas, the ancient Scythia, the 
modern Tartary and Siberia, seem in all ages of the world to have been in the 
same barbarous and uncivilised state in which we find them at present. 
 
The nations that, according to the best authenticated history, appear to 
have been first civilised, were those that dwelt round the coast of 
Mediterranean sea. 
 
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (I, iii) (1776) 
 
The geography school of thought has a long pedigree and dates as long back 
as Aristotle,8 but it is Montesquieu (1750) who is credited for presenting the first 
systematic theory linking geography with development of human society in his 
classical treatise The Spirit of Laws [Olsson (2003b)]. The focus of early writers of 
this school of thought was primarily on climate and its impact on human effort. 
Prominent among those were Huntington (1915) and GilFillan (1920). This strand of 
thought reached its zenith in the early decades of the twentieth century when it had 
considerable influence on the scientific community and civil society, especially in 
the developed parts of the world. Later, however, it fell into disrepute as “modern 
sensibilities” refused to accept its racial undertones.9  Landes (1998) writes that 
geography had lost ground when, after World War II, Harvard University abolished 
its geography department, and many other universities followed suit. Of late, 
however, geography is enjoying a kind of renaissance, and a huge effort has been 
launched by contemporary writers on geography [Diamond (1997), Landes (1998), 
and Sachs, et al. (various publications)] to place it back into its lost position. This re-
launch effort was based on the realisation that the early writers went “too far” 
[Landes (1998), p. 3]. Owing to its discontinuity, we divide the geography thought 
into the “classics”, which includes the work of the early writers (e.g. Montesquieu, 
Huntington and GilFillan),10 and the “contemporaries”. 
 
2.1. The Classics 
 
2.1.1. Climate Conditions 
Montesquieu asserted that climate has a direst bearing on the 
temperaments and customs of a country’s inhabitants.11 People of colder 
climates are vigorous, courageous, phlegmatic, disciplined, and more 
                                                                          
8Aristotle is known for introducing the concept of “Meteorolgica”, i.e. zone of habitable 
world (latitudinally oriented). Based on his observations, he conjectured that the most hospitable 
zones were the mid-latitude regions. 
9Primarily, this school attributed the superior culture of the Western Europe (and its off 
shoots) to its colder climate. 
10This list is by no means exhaustive; it rather represents the most influential works as noted 
by the research community [see Olsson (2003b) for this point]. 
11http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/montesquieu. 
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determined than people of hotter climates.12  People of hotter climates are more 
fearful and susceptible to temptations, less resolute and less capable of decisive 
action. The quality of soil was also important as it influenced the form the 
government might take. He theorised that fertile countries were more prone to 
be ruled by monarchies, whereas republics were more common in barren areas.13 
Thus, he explains why Asia is more prone to despotism: first, it lacks temperate 
zones; second, Asia has much larger plains than Europe, hence, rendering it 
vulnerable so “the warlike, brave, and active people touch immediately upon 
those who are indolent, effeminate, and timorous; the one must, therefore, 
conquer, and the other be conquered” (Montesquieu, SL 17.3). 
“No nation has risen to highest grade of civilisation except in regions 
where climate stimulus is great. This statement sums up our entire 
hypothesis”. [Huntington (1915)]. 
Huntington (1915) is another major work on these lines. In “Civilisation 
and Climate” he sought to understand the reasons for the progress of human 
civilisations. His work, more scientific than that of Montesquieu in the sense 
that he based his assertions on results of field experiments,14 also linked climate 
with human activity.  His main assertion was that mental and physical vigor 
were related to outside temperature. The ideal working conditions, according to 
him, are those in which temperature ranged between 38 degree Fahrenheit (mean 
winter temperatures) and 65 degrees (mean summer temperatures), found in 
temperate zones of the world.15 The right combination of temperature and 
humidity lends energy to people, which then enables them to be more honest, 
self-controlled, and willing to take initiatives. The tropical climate, on the other 
hand, weakens character through inducing a proneness to indulgence, inertia, 
and weakness of will [Whitebeck (1916)]. 
“The leadership in world civilisation is inseparably linked with climate”. 
[GilFillan (1920), The Coldward Course of Progress]. 
                                                                          
12He reasons that blood rushes faster through the veins in colder climates, making heart 
stronger, which meant that people of northern hemisphere had more vigor while those of southern 
hemisphere were lazy. 
13He gives three reasons for this assertion. First, fertile countries are more prone to 
invasions, (more desirable and easier to conquer as they “are always of a level surface” (SL 18.2)); 
second, people of fertile countries value their government for security and not liberty, and 
monarchies are better able to respond to external threats; third, inhabitants of barren countries are 
more “industrious, sober, inured to hardship, courageous, and fit for war” (SL 18.4), and hence 
better able to defend themselves. The inhabitants of fertile countries favour “ease, effeminacy, and a 
certain fondness for preservation of life” (SL 18.4). 
14Huntington assembled data on the impact of weather changes on daily “nervous activity”, 
productivity, “feelings and energy” [Stehr and  Storch (1998)].  
15Results of field experiments indicated that an average temperature of 65 degree Fahrenheit 
was optimum for physical work, and average temperature of 38 degree Fahrenheit maximised mental 
activity [Whitebeck (1916)]. 
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Above are the opening lines of the famous GilFillan’s 1920 article. His 
explanation of the “Coldward Course of Progress” away from early centre of 
civilisations in Sumer and Egypt in the third millennium B.C (average temperature 
74˚F), via Rome (60˚F) to Berlin (48˚F) in early twentieth century is primarily based 
on climate. He reasons that early civilisations appeared in hot climates because 
agriculture is easy to appear in warm regions, but later, as technology assumed a 
more important role, leadership moved northwards where conditions for mental 
ability were better.16  His argument was that “warmth was necessary for a nascent 
civilisation” as agriculture was most productive there, and an abundant food supply 
released hands for other occupations. However, with developments in agriculture 
technology (use of animals, tools) the importance of warmth diminished and its 
harmful effect on health and “mind” became prominent. Moreover, with the passage 
of time, civilisations have become less dependent on agriculture and more dependent 
on “handicrafts, manufactures, and clerical and other brain occupations” requiring 
mental vigor, “and so, with a civilisation depending on mental effort, the northern 
nations have gone ahead” [GilFillan (1920:398)]. 
 
2.1.2. Water as Power 
In an interesting line of work linking geography with development, Karl 
Wittfogel (1957) develops a thesis that “Hydraulic Civilisations” (i.e. 
civilisations dependent on large scale irrigation networks) are more prone to be 
under some kind of despotic rule. This thesis is more popularly known as 
Oriental Despotism. He reasons that large scale irrigation networks implied 
specialisation and division of labour (for digging, dredging, tool making, etc.), 
an organisational hierarchy for coordinating and directing the activities of mass 
labour, and government control over distribution of water (to ensure proper 
distribution). This led to the development of impersonal governments (as against 
a tribal form of government) with control and monopolisation of political power, 
taking the shape of absolutist states.17  It also meant that agriculture production 
took place at large scale due to economies of scale. This resulted in highly 
stratified societies where ruling élite controlled mass of workers.  
Criticism abound, these classical theories now constitute a disbanded line 
of research.18  Though, they continue to influence contemporary ideas in this 
area even today [Stehr and  Storch (1998)]. 
                                                                          
16GilFillan writes that “fiery and volatile temperament of southern peoples renders them 
incapable of responsibilities and toils by which phlegmatic northern races have made great their 
states” [GilFillan (1920:396)].  
17Wittfogel includes Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, China, and pre-Colombian Mexico and 
Peru in this list. http://www.riseofthewest.net/thinkers/wittfogel05.htm (adapted from on-line 
Encyclopedia Britannica's articles). 
18Climate theories were discredited for their racial undertones and lack of supportive 
evidence. Wittfogel’s theis of Hydraulic Civilisations fits well ancient Chinese empire but is less 
befitting for Indian case which was unified only under the British rule. Moreover, Europe, despite its 
fragmented nature, was united under Roman empire for many centuries. 
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2.2. The Contemporaries 
 
2.2.1. Wealth and Poverty of Nations 
Landes (1998) is one of the recent attempts to explain The Wealth and 
Poverty of the Nations cast in terms of geography. He attributes differences in 
relative prosperity of countries to differences in geographic endowments i.e. 
climate, disease and water. He writes that hot climate of the tropics not only 
implied adaptation of work habits to keep people inactive during midday (like 
siesta)19 but also had negative implications for the disease environment as year 
round heat meant proliferation of pest hostile to men. Tropical areas were also 
hindered in their development by an irregular supply of water. Rainfall, though 
enough on average, is irregular and unpredictable and downpours are extremely 
harsh, so “cultivation does not compete easily with jungle” [Landes (1998: 13)]. 
Storage of water for irrigation purposes is difficult on account of very high rates 
of evaporation. 
In contrast to these so-called “Hydraulic Civilisations”, Europe had (and 
still has) access to a heavy and reliable rain water, which meant that individual 
farmers were not reliant on a ruling elite managing the irrigation network. The 
fragmented nature of European continent implied intense competition among 
many small states with favourable consequences for trade, institutional 
development and individual freedom. European domination of the world was, 
eventually, helped by its unique topography [Landes (1998)]. 
Another feature of European topography that has received scholarly 
attention is its unique position in term of access to the Atlantic Ocean. Oceanic 
currents made it easy for Europeans to reach the Americas, which had abundant 
supplies of natural resources including precious metals.20  Dependency theorists 
assert that resources extracted from these colonies are partly responsible for the 
economic success of Europe and the underdevelopment of rest of the world. 
  
2.2.2. The Resource Curse 
This line of research links natural resource endowment (e.g. oil, minerals, 
diamonds) of a country with its growth potential. It draws its name from the 
empirical observation that resource rich countries (Latin America and some 
African countries) have experienced slower growth compared to resource poor 
countries (East Asian NICs). Many explanations are offered for this empirical 
regularity. One is the Dutch Disease Phenomenon. It typically refers to a 
situation where discovery of a primary natural resource appreciates the value of 
                                                                          
19He writes that “in British India, the saying had it, only mad dogs and Englishmen went out 
in the noonday sun. The natives knew better” [Landes (1998: 7)]. 
20See Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005b) for empirical verification of this point. 
Their theory, however, stresses that the effect of access to Atlantic on incomes works through 
institutions. 
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currency for that country and diverts investment away from manufacturing and 
service sectors and hence lowers growth rate [De Silva (1994), Gylfason (2001a, 
2001c), Gylfason, et al. (1999), Matsen and Torvik (2003), Mckinley (2005), 
Nakahodo and Jank (2006)]. Others have stressed the political economy 
consequences of rich resource base. They argue that natural resource abundance 
increases corruption and rent seeking activities and reduces incentives for 
productive activities [Auty (2004), Bulte, Damania, and Deacon (2005), Collier 
and Hoeffler (1998), Deacon and Mueller (2004), Eifert, Gelb, and Tallroth 
(2002), Gylfason and Zoega (2001), Gylfason (2001b), Olsson (2003a), 
Pritchett, Woolcock, Busby, and Isham (2004), Ross (2001,1999), Sachs and 
Warner (2001)].  
 
2.2.3.  ‘Geography Determines’ 
Though a number of researchers have worked on re-invoking interest in 
geography as a possible explanatory factor behind different evolutionary pattern 
of regions overtime, but it is to the credit of Jeffery Sachs and his colleagues 
[Sachs (2003, 2001), Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999), Radelet and Sachs 
(1998), Gallup (1998)] that geography is finding its way back into theoretical 
and empirical studies of economic growth. In a series of papers these authors 
have tried to show that various measures of prosperity (per capita income, 
growth rates) are strongly correlated with geographical and ecological measures 
(climate zones, disease ecology, distance from coast etc.) [Sachs (2003)]. They 
assert that tropical regions are hindered in their development on account of low 
agriculture productivity, high disease burden, and high transport cost.21  Sachs 
(2001) proposes five hypotheses regarding tropical underdevelopment. He 
summarises his assertions as: (1) technologies in critical areas of health, 
agriculture, construction, energy use, and other manufacturing processes are 
specific to ecological zones; (2) by the start of modern era temperate zone 
technologies were more productive than tropical zone technologies; (3) 
technological development is an increasing returns to scale activity;22 (4) social 
change processes (especially urbanisation and demographic transition) amplified 
this gap; (5) geopolitical factors (European imperialism, control of international 
financial institutions by rich nations of the world) widened this divide even 
further [Sachs (2001)]. 
Gallup (1998) shows that agriculture productivity is sensitive to ecological 
conditions (climate, water availability, and soil fertility). His empirical findings 
suggest that, compared to the temperate zones, agriculture productivity is 30–35 
                                                                          
21High transport costs are due to (1) limited access to sea and ocean navigable rivers (a high 
percentage of population living in hinterlands, higher number of landlocked economies), and (2) 
greater distance from major economic centers of the world.  
22He considers this to be the main amplifier of gap between temperate zone and tropical 
zone economies. 
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percent lower in the tropics. Gallup and Sachs (2001) document evidence of 
geography affecting the economic performance of countries through higher 
disease burden. They show that countries with intensive malaria had 33 percent 
lower incomes than countries without malaria. Radelet and Sachs (1998) estimate 
that landlocked country, where shipping cost are magnitude of a degree higher 
than similar coastal economy, experiences slower growth.23  Their argument will 
be taken up again in Section (4) where we discuss the debate. 
 
2.3. Geography and Long-run Development 
One of the most influential and controversial work, in recent times, on 
geography and economic development over the long run is that of Diamond 
(1997). The question that he seeks to address through his work Guns, Germs 
and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies24 is, “Why did Europe colonise 
America (and other parts of the world) and not the other way round?” He 
asserts that Europe had superior technology and political organisation 
compared to any other region around 1500 A.D.—the time when epoch of 
colonisation began to take place. He attributes this to different rates of 
development on different continents from 11,000 B.C.25 to A.D. 1500. Areas 
that made an early transition to settled agriculture were the ones that 
developed skills of writing, metallurgy (guns, swords etc.), and complex 
political organisation. So the time when European colonisers met the Native 
American people, and later Aboriginal Australians, they were armed with 
steel swords and guns while their opponents still had weapons made of stone 
and wood. Europeans colonisers also had the means to reach the Americas—
large ocean going ships, navigation skills, maps, sailing directions and 
accounts by earlier explorers etc. He also stresses the role played by 
infectious diseases (smallpox, measles), which were introduced by the 
Europeans, in the demise of Native Americans. He estimates that around 95 
percent of the local population was killed by these diseases. These epidemic 
diseases, a phenomenon of dense human population in cities and towns, find 
their origin in similar epidemic diseases of dense population of domestic 
animals with which the people of old world came in contact with.  
                                                                          
23A 10 percent increase in distance from the sea is associated with 1.3 percent increase in 
shipping costs. An increase of 50 percent in shipping costs reduces growth rates by 0.3 percent per 
annum [Radelet and Sachs (1998)]. 
24Typically he asked why a few hundred Spaniards under CortŽs and Pizarro overthrew the 
Aztec and Inca Empires? Why Emperors Montezuma or Atahuallpa did not lead the Aztecs or Incas 
to conquer Europe? 
25Diamond asserts that 11,000 B.C. is a suitable starting point from which to compare 
historical developments on the different continents, because this date corresponds to the end of the 
Pleistocene Era and last Ice age (start of the recent era in geological terms). This date also 
corresponds to the beginning of the village life in some parts of the world. Domestication of plants 
and animals started within a few thousand years of this date [Diamond (1997: 35)]. 
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Why these differences in the level of technology and in the immune 
systems? Diamond’s thesis goes as follows: Eurasia26 (owing to its large size 
and Mediterranean climate) was naturally endowed with the highest number of 
animal and plant species that could be domesticated. Whereas most of the large 
mammal species of the North and South America had become extinct by the end 
of the last ice age 13,000 years ago, Europe still had a large number of animal27 
and plant species (partly owing to its large land mass) that were suitable for 
domestication. Eurasia’s east/west axis meant easier diffusion of these species 
across the whole region.28  In contrast, the north/south axis of the America made 
this diffusion difficult.29  Similarly for Africa, which should have enjoyed 
enormous head start over Europe because humans have been evolving there 
millions of years longer than in Europe, limited availability of plants and 
animals that were suitable for domestication and north/south orientation had 
implications for later development (or lack of it).30 
Domestication of plants and animals had far reaching consequences for 
the Eurasian region. Domestication of animals revolutionised land transport. It 
also revolutionised agriculture. Use of animals in agriculture meant that the 
farmer could till larger tracts of land then he could do so with his own effort 
alone. Domestication of plants meant more calories per acre compared to wild 
habitat where most species are inedible. Dense population settlements began to 
emerge. Food surpluses generated in agriculture led to increased specialisation 
of work force31 and emergence of “stratified and politically centralised 
societies” with ruling elites. These developments were accompanied by 
                                                                          
26Includes Europe, parts of Asia, near East, and the Fertile Crescent. 
27Native Americans, by contrast, inherited only limited species of domesticated animals 
(llama and alpaca). 
28Animals and plants that were domesticated in one part of the continent could travel to 
other parts without encountering great variation in day length and climate. So “chicken and citrus 
fruits domesticated in Southeast Asia quickly spread westward to Europe; horses domesticated in the 
Ukraine quickly spread eastward to China; and the sheep, goats, cattle, wheat and barley of the 
fertile crescent quickly spread both west and east” [Diamond (1997), http://www.edge.org/ 
3rd_culture/diamond/diamond_p1.html]. 
29Plants and animals domesticated in one part could not travel to other part without 
encountering changes in day length and climate. So, Turkey never traveled from Mexico to Andes, 
and llamas and alpacas from Andes to Mexico, and the Central America remained without pack 
animals. Diamond further writes that “it took thousands of years for the corn that evolved in 
Mexico’s climate to become modified into a corn adapted to the short growing season and seasonally 
changing day length of North America” (Diamond ibid). 
30All of Africa’s domesticated animals (cattle, sheep, goats, and horses) traveled from 
Eurasian continent. Africa’s big wild animals proved unsuitable for domestication (due to their 
social behaviour, breeding habits etc.). Food staples of ancient Egypt (wheat and barley), which 
require winter rains and variation in day length for their germination, could not spread southwards 
because Central Africa had summer rains and relatively constant day length. Agricultural 
development in Sub Saharan Africa had to await the domestication of native plant species i.e. 
sorghum and millet. 
31Not everyone had to grow food for himself so some hands were free for other occupations. 
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technological advancement as craftspeople (those who were not engaged in 
agriculture) devoted themselves to science of metallurgy, and writing etc. The 
end result was that Eurasia had advantage in guns (and germs), swords, 
oceangoing technology (Large ships, maps and other navigation tools) political 
organisation, and writing, all of which were products of large, dense, sedentary, 
stratified societies made possible by agriculture. This early advantage allowed 
Eurasia to colonise the Americas and Africa [Diamond (1997)]. 
Olsson and Hibbs (2000), in an interesting and innovative work, 
encapsulate the essence of Diamond’s (1997) theory, and test it empirically. It is 
worth summing up Diamond’s work in a few lines. He basically argued that the 
Eurasian continent-owing to its enormous size, its East-West orientation, and 
large Mediterranean climate zone—was naturally endowed with a rich 
biogeographic potential. This led to an early emergence of settled agriculture in 
this region. Food surpluses, generated by superior agriculture technology, made 
possible the development of a non-food producing class which then engaged in 
creation of knowledge and other innovative activities which resulted in the 
development of writing, military and transport technology that put Eurasia ahead 
of other continents. In short, their testable hypothesis is that the initial 
biogeographic conditions32 determined the timing of transition to sedentary 
agriculture. The resultant (accelerated) technological progress33 yielded regional 
development advantages that to some degree affect present day per capita 
incomes. The following figure describes the sequencing of their logic.  
Fig. 1. Biogeography and Long-run Economic Development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Olsson and Hibbs (2000). 
                                                                          
32i.e. biogeographical conditions 12,000 years ago, before the onset of settled agriculture. 
33See Diamond (1997) for this argument. 
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Agriculture first appeared in the Fertile Crescent around 8500 B.C.34 The 
first signs of domesticated barley and einkorn wheat appeared in the Jordan 
Valley along with the domestication of goats, sheep, pigs and later cattle. About 
4500 years later, the first civilisation emerged in the river valleys of Tigris and 
Euphrates.35 China followed suit after about a thousand years and Central 
Mexico 5000 years later. Agriculture did not spread south towards Andes where 
agriculture was based on potato and manioc. 
Areas where agriculture first appeared had many commonalities. In all 
regions seed plants were brought under domestication; their wild ancestors were 
important food sources of hunters and gatherers. These areas had rich varieties 
of wild plants and animals and reliable sources of water (rivers, lakes), and these 
people lived in relatively dense permanent communities [Smith (1998), cited in 
Hibbs and Olsson (2000:7)]. Moreover, the first strand of domesticated wheat 
appeared near garbage heaps, forest paths, and cooking places where these seeds 
might have been left unintentionally [Diamond (1997), cited in Hibbs and 
Olsson (2000:7)]. They also had elementary-level technology for settled 
agriculture, e.g., flint blades. Table 1 below depicts the dates of transition to 
settled agriculture. 
 
Table 1  
Independent Origins of Sedentary Agriculture 
  Area Date Domesticated Plants Domesticated Animals 
Near East 8500 B.C. wheat, barley pea goats, sheep 
China 7500 B.C. Rice, millet pig 
Central Mexico 3500 B.C. Corn, beans turkey 
South Central Andes 3500 B.C. Potato, manioc llama, guinea pig 
Eastern United States 2500 B.C. sunflower None 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4000 B.C. sorghum None 
Adapted from Olsson and Hibbs (2000). 
 
The evidence suggests that agriculture first appeared in regions that 
had relatively rich supplies of plants and animals suitable for domestication. 
Out of 56 heavy seeded wild grasses that are suitable candidates for 
domestication, as many as 33 are found in the Western part of Eurasia, i.e., 
the Mediterranean zone of Near East (see the table below). Further, out of 
                                                                          
34These dates are calibrated radiocarbon dates and refer to the first attested date of 
domestication of an animal or plant. 
35The civilisation had developed writing, science, religion, cities, and states.  
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148 species of animals36 that are suitable for domestication, and of which 
only 14 have ever been domesticated, 9 are found in the Near East [Hibbs 
and Olsson (2000: 9)]. It is clear from the Table  (2) below that Eurasia had 
a rich biogeographic potential for agricultural development as compared to 
other regions of the world. 
 
Table 2 
 Distribution of Species Suitable for Domestication 
Area Number of Plants Number of Animals 
Near East, Europe, North Africa 33 9 
East Asia 6 7 
Southeast Asia 6 2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4 0 
North America 4 0 
Central America 5 0 
South America 2 1 
Australia 2 0 
Pacific Island and Iceland 0 0 
Adapted from Olsson and Hibbs (2000). 
 
While Diamond (1997) did not make an effort to link biogeographic 
potential with the present level of well-being, Hibbs and Olsson (2000) fills 
up this gap. They develop a framework that provides a link between initial 
biogeographic endowment and present day incomes, and explains economic 
development over three major stages of history; the hunter-gatherer stage, 
the agriculture stage, and the industrial stage, based on following ‘stylised 
facts’ (1) agriculture first emerged in areas with rich biogeographic 
potential, (2) there were no ‘inherent differences in ability’ of hunter-
gatherers to exploit their natural environment, (3) agriculture development 
lead to emergence of a class of people37 who did not have to get involved in 
food production and lived on food surpluses generated by the agriculture 
sector, (4) the emergence of non-food sector set off a process of endogenous 
knowledge creation and population expansion, (5) living standards did not 
increase much before the industrial revolution. Results of the empirical 
exercise validate their hypothesis. In addition, it provides evidence that 
initial biogeographic potential has direct effect on incomes even today. 
We conclude our discussion of the geography school here and now turn to 
the institutions school. 
                                                                          
36Big herbivorous mammals. 
37Chiefs, craftsmen, and bureaucrats. 
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3. INSTITUTIONS—THE FUNDAMENTAL DETERMINANT 
“[C]ommerce and manufactures gradually introduce order and good 
government, and with them, liberty and security of individuals… This, though 
it has been least observed, is by far the most important of all their effect.” 
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (book III, chapter iv) 
 
“Individuals must be lured by incentives to undertake the socially desirable 
activities.” 
North, D. and R. P. Thomas, The Rise of The Western World (1973) 
 
The idea that institutions matter for economic outcomes had long been 
realised in the writings of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, but it is North 
(1990) who is credited for outlining a theory of institutions and incorporating 
them in mainstream economics.38 The basic idea that this school of thought 
propagates is that “institutions matter”.39 Markets, which are the hallmark of 
Western capitalist system and are responsible for the unprecedented expansion 
of economic activities, do not exist in vacuum. They are supported by a complex 
web of institutional infrastructure [Grief (2005)]. Even a simple exchange, e.g. 
purchase of oranges in public market, is “complex in terms of its fundamental 
characteristics…Underlying the transaction-making it possible-[i]s a complex 
structure of law and its enforcement” [North (1981), p. 35].40  
Before we discuss relevance of institutions for economic performance, we 
have to define what institutions are? What is their purpose? 
 
3.1.  Defining Institutions 
Institutions are the rules societies live by. They are humanly devised 
constraints that shape and guide human interactions [North (1990:3)]. Rawls 
defines institutions as a “public system of rules that specify certain actions as 
permissible, other as forbidden, and provide for certain penalties and defenses 
when violations occur” [cited from Runge (1984, p. 807)].  
North (1990) differentiates between formal and informal constraints. 
Formal constraints are the rules devised by human beings to facilitate 
exchange.41  Informal constraints are the norms, conventions, and code of ethics 
                                                                          
38North’s earlier work [North (1973, 1981)] was also an effort to highlight importance of 
institutions, but the theory was finalised in his work, “Institutions, Institutional Change and 
Economic Performance” (1990). Also see Eggertsson (1990) for how economic behaviour is 
influenced by institutions. 
39See Harriss, Hunter, and Lewis (1995), Nabli and Nugent (1989), Aron (2000), Jütting 
(2003), and Bennedsen, Malchow-Møller, and Vinten (2005) for review of the institutions school. 
40Implying that the property rights of buyers and sellers are recognised and enforced by a 
system of law. 
41These include political (and judicial) rules, economic rules and contracts. Among these, 
economic rules have received considerable attention in the current literature on institutions and 
growth. Basically, economic rules define property rights. Property right is the right to use, earn 
income from and alienate a resource [Barzel (1989)]. 
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that societies evolve over time.42  In line with this approach, Greif (2005) 
deconstructs institutions into four components; between organic (informal) and 
designed (formal), and between private order and public order. 
Rules are not always self-enforcing, and this brings in the important role 
of enforcement mechanism. In fact, North (1990) devotes considerable attention 
to this issue. Enforcement would not be a problem if parties to exchange have 
complete (and costless) information43 about each other and exchange is mutually 
beneficial for both of them. It becomes a problem when information is costly 
and incomplete,44 and benefits from shirking are substantial. When information 
is incomplete “the cooperative solution will break down unless institutions are 
created that provide sufficient information for individuals to police deviations” 
[North (1990: 57)]. 
Thus, an integral part of any institution is the enforcement mechanism; 
ways to ensure that rules are observed, and punishment is enacted when rules are 
violated. The costliness of ascertaining violations and the severity of punishment 
are considered to be an essential part of the functioning of institutions [North 
(1990)].  North argues that ultimately those institutions are required that can use 
threat of coercion to enforce agreements, and the state is the only authority that 
can exercise this threat of coercion.45  These rules and enforcement mechanisms 
are the essence of institutions. 
 
3.2. A Theory of Institutions 
The central problem in North’s theory of institutions is the problem of 
cooperation—cooperation that allows individuals and societies to capture gains 
from trade.  
The neoclassical theory of exchange envisions a frictionless economy 
where (1) markets are competitive, (2) property rights are perfectly defined and 
costlessly enforced, (3) information is perfect and parties to exchange have 
mental abilities to process this information, (4) governments are neutral, and (5) 
tastes are unchanging [North (1978: 964)]. In short, it assumes a situation where 
transaction costs46 are zero. The fundamental problem with this theory, 
according to North, is that it misconstrues the nature of human coordination and 
cooperation.  
In real life situations cooperation cannot be taken for granted. One particular 
instance of cooperation failure that has received considerable attention in game 
                                                                          
42These constraints are more pervasive then formal rules. This differentiation helps him 
explain why same formal rules when applied to different societies yield different results. 
43i.e. the cost of measuring the multiple margins of performance. 
44In real life situations information is incomplete and highly asymmetrical [see Akerlof (1970)]. 
45North (1981) writes that the state, as a third party, can reduce transaction cost by 
developing an impersonal body of law and its enforcements. 
46Transaction costs are costs of defining, protecting and enforcing property rights [Barzel 
(1989)] and contracts. 
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theoretic framework is that of ‘prisoner’s dilemma’47 that was the mainstay of 
Hardin’s ‘Tragedy of the Commons’.48 Although the theory has come under serious 
attack, and very few people believe in real life application of it, it did bring to the 
forefront the problem of ‘opportunism’,49 and ‘shirking’. The theory points to the 
impossibility of rational, wealth maximising individuals to cooperate. 
Later developments in game theory acknowledge the emergence of 
cooperative behaviour given game is repeated a number of times, each player 
has perfect knowledge about the past strategy of other players, and number of 
players is small. This framework fits well a situation of personal exchange in our 
daily life but fails to explain impersonal exchange, which, as North (1990) 
writes, is an antithesis of the condition for game theoretic cooperation. “As we 
move away from choices involving personal and repetitive actions to making 
choices involving impersonal and non-repetitive exchanges the uncertainty 
about outcomes increases.” [North (1990: 22)]. 
This uncertainty comes from incomplete information about the 
behaviour of other individuals in the process of human interaction. Even if 
complete information was available, individuals have limited mental 
capacity to process, organise and utilise information—bounded rationality.50 
                                                                          
47Prisoner’s dilemma is visualised as a non-cooperative game in which communication among 
players is forbidden. Each player has complete information about the full structure of the game tree and the 
payoffs attached to outcomes. Each player has a dominant strategy, meaning that the player is always better 
off choosing that strategy. The game is built round two players. Two suspects are being interrogated for a 
crime they jointly committed. They know that if both remain silent they will receive a light prison sentence. 
If one stays silent while the other confesses the first will receive a long prison and the other will go free. If 
both confess they receive a medium prison. Each person chooses only once, meaning that if the first person 
stays silent and the other confesses the first one cannot change the outcome. This then creates the dilemma. 
Their joint interest is not to confess (i.e. cooperate so both get light prison).  From the point of view of 
either one of them, staying silent while the other confesses gives the worst outcome (long prison). 
Confessing at least ensures that this outcome will be avoided. So the rational strategy for both of them is to 
confess, and this is their dominant strategy, and this results in a Pareto inferior outcome. 
48Hardin envisions a grazing ground which is “open to all”. He then examines the situation from 
the point of view a “rational” herdsman. Each herdsman has a utility function, which he seeks to 
maximise; he derives positive utility from selling his animal and negative utility from overgrazing. Each 
herdsman is motivated to add more and more to his herd because he reaps the full, and direct, benefit 
from his animals but bears only a part of the cost resulting from overgrazing, so “each man is locked into 
a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit—in a world that is limited. Ruin is the 
destination towards which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in 
the freedom of the commons” [Hardin (1968: 1244)]. 
49Opportunism may loosely be defined “as the ability of one party to an exchange to benefit 
at the expense of the other party by violating the agreement in his or her post-contractual behaviour” 
[North (1981: 36)]. Main criticism against Hardin’s tragedy of the commons is that it assumes no 
communication among individuals and no information about past behaviours which does not reflect 
real life situation facing any individual. 
50This concept owes its origin to Simon (1957, 1955). While traditional economic theory 
assumes that a rational economic man has complete information and computational skills to analyse 
this information while making a decision, Simon (1955) holds that neither is true. In reality, 
information is not complete, and the individual has limited mental capacity to analyse available 
information. He terms this concept as ‘bounded rationality’. 
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This bounded rationality, combined with uncertainty in deciphering the 
environment, imply the need to develop regularised pattern of human 
interactions called institutions (ibid). As such, institutions perform a 
coordinating function in the society. Rules, by and large, eliminate conflicts 
of interest, and reduce the total amount of ambiguity for those concerned by 
defining what people can expect from fellow human beings. It becomes 
possible to order one’s life with a set of priority regarded as legitimate 
[Colson (1974), c.f. North (1990), p. 38]. Individuals impose constraints 
upon themselves to give a structure to their life and to their relations with 
other human beings. Under conditions of limited information and bounded 
rationality, these constraints reduce the cost of human interaction as 
compared to a world without institutions [North (1990)]. 
 The other important element of his theory is the transaction costs. The 
transaction costs specifically consist of the cost of measurement, and the cost of 
enforcement. The measurement costs are the cost of measuring the valuable 
attributes of what is being exchanged. Commodities, services and performance 
of individuals have many attributes and their level vary from one specimen to 
another. The measurement of these levels is too costly to be comprehensive or 
fully accurate. The information cost in ascertaining the level of attributes yields 
measurement costs. The enforcement costs are the cost of protecting rights and 
policing and enforcing agreements. These arise from incomplete information. 
Because we do not know the attributes of a good or service or all characteristics 
of the performance of an agent we have to devote costly resources to try to 
measure and monitor performance. North (1990) argues that “these 
measurement and enforcement costs are the sources of social, political and 
economic institutions” [North (1990: 27)].  
Three main points emerge from his theory. First, outcomes are uncertain 
under impersonal exchange; second, information is not perfect and human 
beings have limited capacity to analyse that; third, the transaction costs are 
positive. Together these constitute the building blocks of his theory. Given 
these, institutions are needed for an exchange to take place and as such, they 
affect the performance of the economy by their effect on the cost of exchange.51 
We will explain this point with the help one particular type of institution—the 
property institution, as North and Thomas (1973) write, “economic growth will 
occur if property rights make it worthwhile to undertake socially productive 
activity” [North and Thomas (1973: 8)].  
                                                                          
51Runge (1984) argues that institutions “increase the value of a stream of benefits associated 
with economic activity by coordinating behaviour” [Runge (1984: 807)]. It is necessary to make one 
qualification to this statement. Institutions are not always growth enhancing. They have the potential 
to increase output from economic activity, i.e., if appropriate rules are devised and enforced. In most 
third world countries institutions are not efficient. They are not even meant to be efficient. Rather 
“they are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to devise new rules” 
[North (1990: 16)].  
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As again, we begin by defining property system (read institution) and 
property rights. Property system is a system of rules governing access to and 
control over resources. Property systems are central to an economic system as 
they solve problem of allocation of resources [Waldron (1988: 38)]. Property 
rights are relations among individuals that arise from the existence of scarce 
goods and pertain to their use. They specify the norms of behaviour with respect 
to economic goods that all persons must observe in their interaction with other 
people or bear the penalty cost of non-observance [Pejovich (1990)].  
Since property rights determine the conditions of access to and control of 
these scarce resources, a set of particular property right has impact on the 
economic performance of the economy.52  Posner (1973) argues that the function 
of property rights is to create a structure of incentives to use resources 
efficiently.53  A “well-defined” structure of property rights would have four 
important features, i.e., rights are universal, exclusive, transferable and 
enforceable.54  
Exclusivity implies exclusive ownership and a right to exclude non-
owners. It creates a link between one’s right to choose how to use the asset and 
bearing the consequences of that choice. Since the owner of the asset is the only 
person who will receive benefits from that decision, he will have an incentive to 
put his asset to the highest value use. Transferability provides incentive to move 
resources from less productive to more productive opportunities [Pejovich 
(1990:29)]. Enforceability means security from involuntary seizure or 
encroachment by others, what Honore (1961) calls a right to security against the 
expropriation of the asset.55  
Together these four conditions determine an efficient structure of 
property rights.  In case of an inefficient structure of property rights, i.e. when 
rights are either not well defined and or not enforced, the private rate of return 
from an economic activity will differ from the social rate of return. This 
discrepancy implies that a third party will receive some of the benefits or will 
incur some of the costs. If this difference is large enough, such that the private 
costs exceed the private benefits, individuals will not be willing to under take 
socially profitable activities. Economic activities will shrink as a result. “The 
transfer of property rights amongst individual owners through contracting in the 
                                                                          
52This point is advocated by the so-called ‘Property Rights School’. They stress that a well-
defined structure of property rights induces efficiency in the use of resources. Demsetz (1967) is one of 
the pioneering work in this field. Other prominent supporters of this view include Posner (1973); 
Pejovich (1990); Tisdell (1993); Tietenberg (1992, 1994). 
53Cited from Reeve (1986), p.  23. 
54The first three features are identified by Posner (1973) (cited from Reeve 1986) and the 
last feature is highlighted by Tietenberg (1992). 
55Reeve (1986) discusses that interest in a resource is conceptually linked to the means 
available to protect it. A claim to a resource is taken to be good against and legally guaranteed 
against any rival claims. 
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market place requires that the right be exclusive. Not only must the rights be 
measurable; they must also be enforceable” [North (1981: 36)]. 
 
3.3. Institutional Account of Long-run Development 
History matters. It matters not just because we can learn from the past, but 
because the present and the future are connected to the past by the 
continuity of a society’s institutions… The evolution of institutions that 
create an hospitable environment for cooperative solutions to complex 
exchange provides for economic growth.  
Douglas North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1990) 
 
What explains unprecedented increases in the fortunes of the Western World 
over the last couple of centuries? Douglas North, in a long span of both collaborative 
and individual research [North (1973, 1981, 1990)], explains the economic rise of 
the Western World in terms of the evolution of its institutions from inefficient to 
efficient ones. In discussing the contours of European society between 1100 and 
1800, North and Thomas (1970) write that productivity increases during this time 
period can only be explained by a theory of institutional change [North and Thomas 
(1970: 4)]. Europe’s recent economic successes are attributed to the industrial 
revolution. They argue that significant changes had occurred in the European society 
before this epoch that allowed it to take advantage of such an opportunity—break 
down of feudal culture that created space for establishing private property rights, and 
institutional innovations that solved problem of exchange and allowed market to 
expand were the starting points. From there onwards, it were individuals and 
organisations, in pursuit of profits, that capitalised on these early institutional 
innovations. Below is a brief account, as described in their work, of historical 
evolution of the European (mainly focusing upon English) society, basically from a 
common property based to exclusive ownership and personal village level exchange 
to an impersonal exchange. 
Around the middle of twelfth century, Europe experienced considerable 
expansion of population and colonisation of new territories. This posed no problem 
as abundant arable land was available, so population spread out to north and west 
over Europe. Commerce thrived as different climates and resource base induced a 
variety of crops. Towns grew as population density increased. The era also saw the 
monetisation of services as lords chose to receive money payment in lieu of 
mandatory defensive services. Towns developed their own administrations and 
bodies of law to settle disputes. By the thirteenth century, however, the situation 
changed dramatically. Ever increasing population implied that relative factor 
intensities of agriculture production changed. Good quality land had become scare 
and labour was abundant. Food prices increased, real wages declined, and standard 
of living of peasants declined as a result. Despite all this, commerce continued to 
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flourish in Italy, France, Germany and other parts of Europe [North and Thomas 
(1970, 1973)],56  and the same era saw considerable expansion of trade.  
The fourteenth century once again saw a reversal of relative product and 
factor values. The famine of 1315-17, and the black death57 of 1347-51 caused a 
decline in the population. Marginal lands went out of production. Some land was 
shifted to livestock production. Land rents declined for the landlords and real wages 
of labour increased. Bonds of manorialism became weak as land leases were 
lengthened, and the tenants began to acquire exclusive rights over land. So, by the 
time population began to rise again in the last half of fifteenth century, the structure 
of feudal society and lord-serf relations had changed. Agriculture prices increased 
once again and real wages declined. The sixteenth century saw the same trend of 
falling real wages and rising agriculture prices. What made this century different 
from the thirteenth century was substantial improvements in the transportation 
sector. Progress in ocean navigation technology resulted in discoveries and 
settlement of the New World, so Malthusian checks dampened. Structure of property 
rights evolved (from common property based to exclusive property) and England 
saw the first effort at “enclosures”. The sixteenth century was also an era of 
commercial expansion. Interregional trade was possible because spread of 
population into new territories opened up areas with different resource endowments. 
Wine trade expanded because viticulture was possible in many new areas and fine 
wine was in demand. Wool trade, particularly of woolen cloth, also expanded.58 An 
additional factor contributing to expansion of trade was the influx of treasures from 
the New World, as it contributed to increased size of the market and provided 
impetus for trade. As a consequence, substantial institutional innovations took place 
described as “commercial revolution” [North and Thomas (1970, 1973)].59 
Commercial revolution is considered as the most important economic epoch 
after the Neolithic transformation. Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast (1994) write that 
the “European economic growth between the tenth and fourteenth centuries was 
facilitated by the commercial revolution of the Middle Ages” [Greif, Milgrom and 
Weingast (1994: 746)]. This commercial revolution was made possible by the 
development of institutions that took care of many contractual problems associated 
with long distance trade [Greif (1989, 1993, 2003)]. Long distance trade in 
medieval times was afflicted with many problems. One was the agency problem. 
Traders used to send their cargo to distant market through agents. One difficulty 
was to ensure that the agent did not deceive the principal. This problem was solved 
by the use of kinship ties (commenda). The second problem was the commitment 
                                                                          
56Reasons of expansion of commerce will be discussed shortly. 
57The Black Death refers to the plagues (both bubonic and pneumonic) that hit Europe 
during 1347-51. 
58Presumably, expansion of population into the north of Europe increased the demand for 
woolen cloth. 
59Some of these institutional innovations were the beginning of joint stock companies, 
sophisticated forms of insurance, development of international financial markets. 
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problem i.e. of contract fulfillment and enforcement [North (1990)]. Long distance 
trade, owing to geographic separation of trading parties, is specified by the 
separation of quid and quo,60 which lends an extra element of risk to it. If goods are 
delivered before payment is made then seller is taking a risk because buyer can 
change his mind, and vice versa. The problem was compounded by the issues of 
jurisdiction. City states could enforce contracts within their territories but could not 
enforce agreements when the other contracting party was in distant city. “The 
separation of the quid and the quo created the possibility that one party, however 
well-intentioned ex ante, would find it to his advantage ex post to reopen the 
bargaining or simply welsh on the deal” [Dam (2006: 3)]. This had serious 
implications for the size of the market since such threat would induce many 
individuals not to take part in the market activities. Institutions had to be created to 
counter possibilities of ex-post opportunism, i.e., to make parties commit ex ante 
that they would not breach the contractual obligation ex post.61 
Since impersonal exchange, characterised by the separation of quid and quo, 
was common feature in late medieval Europe,62 and no state had developed the 
legal system to enforce contracts in distant places, some system must have been put 
in place to mitigate the contractual problem. One such system was the community 
responsibility system [Greif (2003)]. Much of the trade in Europe was conducted in 
the context of local communities. These were self-governing units and membership 
of community was not easily acquired.63 Under community responsibility system 
(CRS), every member of the community was liable for the other member’s default 
in inter-community exchange. The strategy for controlling opportunistic behaviour, 
depending upon situation, varied from property confiscation, to cessation of trade 
for a finite period of time (in cases of disagreement that a violation has occurred).64 
Another solution to contractual problems in long distance trade involved 
merchant guilds. Famous among these are the German Hansa and Maghribi traders. 
These guilds operated on principles of multilateral reputation. German Hansa 
governed relationships among German merchants and foreign towns in their trading 
relations. Under Hanseatic League, German merchants established kontor in 
foreign cities that coordinated the response of German merchants in disputes with 
the town. It used threat of embargo as retaliation against defection. One often cited 
                                                                          
60This is in sharp contrast to public market or ‘bazaar’, where quid and quo are exchanged 
simultaneously [Dam (2006)]. 
61This is in contrast to the personal exchange where repeated interaction and/or family ties 
are used to control chances of opportunism. 
62Merchants from different parts of Europe (and indeed from other parts of the world as well) 
took part in the buying and selling activities in market places, along with a host of other activities like 
exchange of credit, future orders, etc. [Greif (2003)]. Before permanent markets were developed, 
regional fairs provided such opportunities for exchange. Famous example of such fairs is the 
Champagne fair in France [North and Thomas (1973)]. 
63In Venice, e.g., one had to pay taxes for twenty five years to be eligible for membership. 
64In Florence, for example, thirty six cases of disputes, confiscation and cessation of trade 
were reported [cited in Greif (2003)]. 
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example is the Hanseatic embargo against the city of Bruges that forced the city to 
adhere to its contractual agreement with the German merchants65 [Greif (1994)]. 
Maghribi traders is yet another example of institutional innovation aimed at solving 
agency problem in long distance trade. It was a coalition of Jewish traders that 
operated in the Mediterranean zone in the eleventh century. In the absence of 
contractual relations, goods had to be shipped to their destination town before 
they could be sold. An efficient response to this situation was to use overseas 
agent to cut costs, instead of traveling with the goods. This posed serious agency 
problems as the agent could cheat in the business transactions conducted in far-
off areas. The Maghribi traders got around this problem by forming a coalition 
that retaliated against overseas agents who acted against interest of its members. 
This mechanism provided a credible threat that single merchant, acting on its 
own in anonymous agent market, could not provide. Since Maghribi traders was 
a closed ethnic group, information flow was smooth and fast. Any news of agent 
cheating on its principal traveled quickly to other coalition members. Hence, it 
was in the interest of the agent to ‘act honestly’ and develop a clean reputation 
so as not to deprive himself of future business opportunities [Greif (1989)]. 
Successes from commercial revolution were soon translated into other 
institutional innovations in the seventeenth century, particularly in England. 
Introduction of patent laws, joint stock companies, insurance companies, 
creation of central bank, issuance of bank notes, discounting bills, interest on 
deposits are all example of innovations that created opportunities for 
accumulation of physical and human capital for innovative activities, for 
investment in productive activities and, as such, created an environment 
favourable for growth [North and Thomas (1973)]. 
 
3.4. Empirical Evidence 
For a long period of time theoretical research on institutions outpaced 
empirical evidence. And that was the strongest criticism against this 
discipline. Beginning 1990s, a number of studies incorporated institutions 
variable in their growth regression framework. Barro (1991, 1997), Knack 
and Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999) are some of the earliest attempts 
in this regard.66 They all found evidence in support of the ‘institutions 
                                                                          
65The embargo was imposed because Bruges abused rights (trading privileges) of foreign 
merchants. The first embargo, which was imposed in 1280, failed to constrain Bruges from these 
violations because at that time kontor only coordinated the German merchants present in the city. A 
later embargo, imposed in 1307, proved successful because by then kontor was able to coordinate 
response of all German traders including all potential traders from different cities. 
66Although not credited for it, Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Scully (1988) were the 
pioneer studies in using proxies for institutional variables (indices of economic and political freedom 
from Freedom House) in growth regressions. Barro (1991) also differs from other two studies in the 
sense that he did not use institutional quality indices but instead used war deaths and revolutions to 
capture political instability in growth regression framework. 
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hypothesis’. Improving institutional quality had positive effect on 
economic growth. However, these earlier studies suffered from a serious 
estimation problem—they lacked a purely exogenous source of variation 
for the institutions variable. Since institutions can not be assumed to be 
independent of income,67 their estimation procedures were bound to yield 
biased results. Acemogle, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) worked around 
this problem by utilising differences in mortality rates faced by the 
European colonialists as an instrument for current institutions. Their 
reasoning, which has been labeled as ‘germs theory’ of institutional 
development by Easterly and Levine (2003), is summarised here: 
Europeans adopted different colonisation strategies in different colonies. 
They established efficient institutions in places where conditions were 
suitable for their settlement (measured by low mortality rate), and 
extractive institutions where they could not settle in large numbers and 
extractive institutions were more profitable for them. Examples of 
settlement colonies are: USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. These 
early institutions persisted till present time. Using differences in European 
mortality as a purely exogenous source of variation for institutions they 
then estimated the effect of institutions on incomes. Their estimates 
suggested that institutions explained approximately three-quarter of the 
income per capita differences in former colonies, and once institutions 
were controlled for measures of geography (distance from equator, 
continental dummies) did not cause income. Later, Rodrik, et al. (2002), 
Easterly and Levine (2003) and Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) also lend 
support to the institutions hypothesis 
Another issue that has to be solved within this tradition is which 
institutions matter? North (1990) has identified two types of institutions that are 
needed for growth—contract enforcing institutions, and coercion constraining 
institutions (property rights).68  Whereas contract enforcing institutions relate to 
private contracts between citizens, coercion constraining institutions define 
contract between the state and its citizens [Acemoglu and Johnson (2003)]. In a 
series of papers, Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(2003), Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002, 2003) and La 
Porta, et al. (1997, 1998,  1999) have stressed the importance of legal system (a 
proxy for contract enforcing institutions)69  for growth. Their work, more 
generally dubbed under “Law matters”, argues that differences in legal systems 
                                                                          
67Higher incomes can make better institutions more affordable. 
68Coercion constraining institutions ensure protection of property rights against 
expropriation by a predatory state, whereas “the predatory state would specify a set of property 
rights that maximised the revenue of the group in power, regardless of its impact on the wealth of the 
society as a whole” [North (1981: 22)].  Also see Greif (2005) for this point. 
69See Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) for this point. 
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cause different political and economic outcomes [Glaeser and Shleifer (2002)]. 
Legal systems, across the world, are predominantly influenced by either English 
common law or French civil law traditions,70 except for a few countries which 
follow German, Scandinavian or socialist law. These two systems, which were 
transplanted to recipient countries through conquest and colonisation, are 
different from each other in very fundamental ways. Common law relies on 
independent judges, broad legal principles and oral arguments and was 
developed in part to protect the rights of common citizens from expropriation by 
the monarchs. In contrast, civil law relies on professional judges (appointed by 
the royalty to further the interest of the sovereign), legal codes, and written 
records [Glaeser and Shleifer (2002)]. As a result, both legal traditions differ in 
terms of degree of formalism. Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(2003) find that procedural formalism is much greater for civil law countries and 
is related with judicial delays, corruption, and unfair judicial decisions.71  
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) report that, compared 
to common law countries, countries governed by civil law have worse governments, 
i.e. more interventionist in the sense of less secure property rights, worse regulation, 
and inefficient implying bureaucratic delays and little tax compliance.72 Acemoglu 
and Johnson (2003), in an effort to “unbundle institutions” and determine which 
institutions matter the most, find that when measures of contract enforcement and 
property rights are put simultaneously in their regression model, the later trump over 
contract enforcement institutions. Their results imply a direct effect of property 
rights on long run development. Legal system (proxy for contract enforcement) does 
not bear a direct effect on growth, but appears to have an impact on financial 
intermediation (stock market development).  
 
4. THE ROOT CAUSE: INSTITUTIONS OR GEOGRAPHY? 
In previous sections we discussed the two schools of thought and the 
anecdotal evidence that they present in favour of their hypotheses. We 
mentioned earlier in the paper that these factors are now considered as “deeper 
determinants” that explain more proximate causes of growth. But which of these 
provides a more fundamental explanation of the divergence in economic 
performance across countries. The geography school argues that the climate, soil 
quality, water availability, and disease ecology of a region has a direct bearing 
on its growth potential. The institutions school, on the other hand, assigns a 
                                                                          
70Djankov, et al. (2002a) study ‘courts’ and civil procedures in 109 countries. They classify 
42 countries as common law countries, 40 as civil law, and rest as German, Scandinavian, or 
socialist tradition. 
71Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003) construct an index of legal 
procedural formalism based on the number of procedures that litigants and courts use to evict a 
tenant for non-payment and to collect a bounced check. 
72Same is true for countries governed by social, German or Scandinavian law. In all cases, 
common law countries have better governments. 
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primal role to the institutions of the society. For them, institutions define the 
incentive structure facing an individual who then decides whether to invest in 
capital and to engage in productive activities. The respective schools of thought 
have collected enough ammunition in their arsenal to win any battle over this 
issue. In this section, we try to swim through their arguments (and counter 
arguments) to get some sense of where this debate is leading us.  
The geography school points out a number of important geographical 
correlates of modern economic growth. First, countries that lie in the tropics 
are poorer compared to other regions of the world. The average income of 
tropical countries is $3326, of sub-tropical countries $7874, and that of 
temperate countries is $9320.73 If socialist countries are taken out of 
temperate zone countries then the average income of this group rises to 
$14828. Twenty three of the top thirty countries—as ranked by 1995 PPP-
adjusted GDP per capita74—are situated in the temperate zone. The 
following is a map of GDP per capita in 1995 (PPP adjusted) and clearly 
depicts that tropical countries are poorer compared to temperate zone 
countries [Gallup and Sachs (1999)]. 
 
Fig. 2. 
 
 
Second, coastal regions have higher incomes than landlocked regions. 
Except for a few countries within Western and Central Europe, landlocked 
economies are nearly all poor.  Their average income of $1771 is much smaller 
                                                                          
73Tropical countries are defined as those where half or more of the land area is within the 
tropic of cancer and the tropic of Capricorn. Sub-tropical countries are those where half or more area 
is tropical or sub-tropical ecological zone, but where more than half of the area is outside the tropics.  
74Their source for GDP figures is World Bank’s World Development Indicators1998. 
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than the average income of non-European coastal economies (average income of 
$5567) [Gallup and Sachs (1999)]. 
Third, economic growth has been lower for countries afflicted by high 
disease burden. Of the 150 countries in the world with population of over one 
million, 44 have intensive malaria. Of these, 35 are in Africa. Malaria intensive 
countries are on average poorer (average income $1526) than countries without 
malaria (average income $8268). The richest 31 countries have no malaria.  The 
severity and spread of malaria is linked to the climate and ecology.75  Successful 
cases of malaria eradication over the past few decades belong to temperate 
ecological zones with low nighttime outdoor temperatures and less efficient 
malaria vectors. Ninety percent of world’s malaria is in Africa because sub-
Saharan Africa exclusively houses the most efficient vector76 Anopheles 
gambiae and where falciparum malaria predominates77 [Gallup and Sachs 
(2000)]. 
Gallup and Sachs (1999) write that “leading thinkers have pointed to four 
major areas in which geography will play a fundamental direct role in economic 
productivity: transport costs, human health, agriculture productivity (including 
animal husbandry); and proximity and ownership of natural resources” [Gallup 
and Sachs (1999:9)]. A number of empirical studies also demonstrate that 
geography does differentiate. Agriculture productivity in the tropics is lower 
than that in the temperate areas [Gallup (1998)]. Tropical countries share a 
higher burden of disease, which lowers their per capita incomes by almost 33 
percent [Gallup and Sachs (2000)]. Landlocked countries face higher cost of 
transportation that lowers their growth rate [Radelet and Sachs (1998)].  
In testing Diamond’s theory of long-run development, Olsson and Hibbs 
(2000) report that countries with favourable initial biogeographic conditions 
made an early transition to sedentary agriculture, which gave them a head start 
over other regions in terms of technological advancement and thus yielded wide 
disparities in economic development across the world. According to their study 
this biogeographic endowment has a direct affect on income even today once the 
impact of institutions is controlled. In a later work, Hibbs and Olsson (2004) 
agree that institutions are strongly connected with national economic 
performance, and that capital accumulation and technological development, the 
proximate causes of growth, are “molded by the political institutions essential 
for the smooth functioning of markets”, but draw attention to “still deeper and 
more—nearly—ultimate sources of contemporary prosperity”—the initial 
                                                                          
75The geographical spread of malaria is determined by the ecology of parasites (different 
species of malaria plasmodia) and disease vectors (different species of Anopheles mosquitoes) 
[Gallup and Sachs (2000)]. 
76Vectorial capacity measures the efficiency with which mosquitoes carry malaria from one 
human to another and has major impact on the feasibility of controlling malaria (ibid). 
77P. falciparum is the most malignant form, compared to less serious P. vivax, P. malariae 
and P. ovale (ibid). 
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biogeographic conditions. “At the core of long-term economic growth has been 
the continued development of technology… Policy makers in the years ahead 
should surely pay far more attention to technological change… if they are to 
successfully address the special problems that face the tropical world” [Sachs 
(2001), p. 28]. 
Of late, the Institutions School has come out very strongly to assert their 
point of view.  Acemoglu et al (2005a) write, “economic institution matter for 
economic growth because they shape the incentives of key economic actors in 
society, in particular, they influence investments in physical and human capital 
and technology, and the organisation of production. Although cultural and 
geographical factors may also matter for economic performance, differences in 
economic institutions are the major source of cross-country differences in 
economic growth and prosperity” [Acemoglu, et al. (2005: 3), emphasis added]. 
The following is a scatter plot of GDP per capita in 1995 and a measure of 
property rights—“protection against expropriation risk”.78 This plot shows that 
countries with better economic institutions (more secure property rights) have 
higher average incomes. 
 
                                                                          
78This scatter plot and following plots are taken from Acemoglu, et al. (2005a). The GDP 
figures are PPP adjusted per capita GDP for 1995 from World Bank’s 1999 World Development 
Indicators. The data on property rights comes from Political Risk services (a private company that 
assesses the risk of investment being expropriated in different countries), and is an average over the 
period 1985-1995. This measure of property right has been used extensively in research [Knack and 
Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, et al. (2001, 2002)]. 
Fig. 3.  Average Protection against Risk of Expropriation 1985–95  
and Log GDP Per Capita 1995 
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Does this scatter plot imply a causal relationship, i.e., do more secure property 
rights cause prosperity. In previous section we have quoted strong empirical evidence 
in favour of institutions hypothesis. In fact, Acemoglu, et al. (2001) estimate that, for 
former colonies, about three quarter of differences in economic performance is 
explained by differences in institutions. And once institutions are accounted for, 
geographic variables do not explain economic performance.  
Empirical evidence also establishes that geography does not explain 
economic performance beyond its ability to explain institutional development i.e., 
geography does not have a direct impact on income but affects it indirectly via 
influencing institutions. Easterly and Levine (2003) test the “crop theory” of 
institutional development. The “crop theory” is due to Engerman and Sokoloff 
(1994) who argue that differential resource endowments of the new world influenced 
the type of institutions that were ultimately established. Land, soil quality and 
climate of Latin America and the Caribbean were suitable for large scale plantation 
crops (e.g., sugar). These areas developed highly stratified societies, where white 
minority elite dominated the majority slave labourers, with extractive institutions.  
Engerman and Sokoloff (1994) document evidence that the ruling elites hindered 
accumulation of human capital by the majority of population, and halted 
development of democratic institutions. North America, on the other hand, had 
resource endowment suitable for small family sized farms for wheat production. 
This led to more homogenous distribution of wealth and power in the society, so 
more egalitarian institutions developed that protected the rights of a broad base of 
citizens. Easterly and Levine (2003) test these competing hypotheses about “deeper 
determinants” of income and report that resource endowments affect income 
indirectly via institutions but do not have a direct effect on income. 
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002) extend this endowments— 
institutions—income framework further by incorporating ‘integration’ as 
another “deeper determinant”. They test the ‘germs theory’ of institutional 
development due to Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). The results of 
their study also confirm that ‘endowments’ do not explain income and hence 
establish the ‘primacy’ of institutions over geography.79 
Acemoglu, et al. (2005a) further document the Korean experience in 
favour of the institutions hypothesis. Korea gained independence from Japan 
after World War II. Soon after, it was divided into North Korea and South 
Korea at the 38th parallel, with North Korea under the communist influence 
and South Korea under American influence. Before this division, Korea shared 
same history, culture, and geography.80  Both countries shared same disease 
                                                                          
79Both geography and integration variables are insignificant in the regression equation.  
80CIA Factbook describes climate of North Korea as “temperate with rainfall concentrated in 
summer” and its terrain as “mostly hills and mountains separated by deep, narrow valleys; coastal 
plains wide in west, discontinuous in east”. It describes climate of South Korea as “temperate, with 
rainfall heavier in summer than winter” and the terrain as “mostly hills and mountains; wide coastal 
plains in west and south” [Acemoglu, et al. (2005a: 18)]. 
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environment, geographical possibilities of access to markets, and transport 
costs. 
After this split, the two parts were organised in radically different ways. 
Since the geography, disease environment, access to markets and transport costs 
did not change radically after the separation, the divergent growth experience of 
the two economies can only be attributed to differences in institutions. The 
North Korea, under Kim II Sung, opted for communist policies, and South 
Korea followed the path of the capitalist system. By the year 2000, per capita 
income in South Korea was $16100, while that of North Korea stagnated at 
$1000. 
The second argument that they put forward in support of their hypothesis 
is “the Reversal of Fortune” among former European colonies. Around 1500, the 
Mughals in India, and the Aztec and Inca Empires in the Americas were among 
the richest of civilisations whereas the territories of North America, Australia 
and New Zealand were inhabited by less developed civilisations. However, after 
the European colonisation, there has been a reversal in incomes. Areas where the 
Mughal, Aztec and Inca Empires once stood are now occupied by societies that 
are ranked at the lower end of world income distribution, and North America, 
Australia and New Zealand are among the richest nations today. They argue that 
this reversal cannot be explained by the geography hypothesis.  The only 
explanation is offered by the institutions hypothesis. 
 
Fig. 4.  Urbanisation in 1500 and Log GDP Per Capita in 1995, among 
Former European Colonies 
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Acemoglu, et al. (2002) provide evidence that this reversal in income is 
explained by reversal in institutions. Using urbanisation rates in 1500 A.D. as 
proxy for prosperity in former colonies81  these authors show that areas that were 
prosperous before colonisation are poor now and vice versa. The scatter plot 
above (Fig. 4) shows relationship between current incomes and urbanisation in 
1500. It can be seen from this plot that countries that were more urbanised in 
1500 (meaning more rich) are relatively poor now. 
If one goes by the geography hypothesis then areas that were rich in 1500 
(owing to their geographical advantage) should be rich today since geography 
did not change much. This reversal is explained by the fact that European 
colonialist established worse institutions in places where they could not settle 
and instead followed an extractive policy. In contrast, areas where they could 
settle in large numbers (settlers colonies include North America, Australia and 
New Zealand), efficient institutions were put in place. Current prosperity of 
these settlers’ colonies is explained by institutions hypothesis. The scatter plot 
below shows that colonies that were rich in 1500 have worse institutions today.82 
 
 
 
Timing of reversal is another issue for Acemoglu, et al. (2005). This 
reversal occurred around end of the eighteenth century when previously poor 
colonies took over the relatively rich colonies. This time period coincides with 
the beginning of the industrial revolution. Diamond (1997) had argued that 
                                                                          
81Since reliable data for income for all colonies is not available for that period. They argue 
that only prosperous regions could have afforded large populations. A scatter plot of urbanisation 
rates and income level of present times show a positive upward slope. 
82Institutional data is described above. Urbanisation rates in 1500 are proxy for prosperity at 
that time since income data is not available. 
Fig. 5.  Urbanisation in 1500 and Average Protection against Risk of  
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Europe had an advantage over others continents (around 1500 when epoch of 
colonisation began to take place) due to its superior technology. Since this 
technology was ecological zone specific, i.e., suitable for temperate climates, 
tropical regions could not use it to their advantage. But reversal in incomes 
occurred around a time period that is characterised by beginning of the industrial 
revolution. They argue that it is hard to imagine why industrial technologies will 
not function in the tropics. For them, the geography hypothesis does not explain 
evolution of world income over the long run. Institutions are the fundamental 
cause of long-run growth.  
 
5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
What is the fundamental determinant of differences in economic 
performance across countries? This paper highlights two such candidates: 
institutions and geography. The geography hypothesis asserts that these 
differences are accounted for by the geography (climate, geology, topography, 
ecology) of a region, which directly affects the quality of land, labour, and 
production techniques. The alternative, the institutions hypothesis, on the other 
hand, documents economic development of human society as a story of 
evolution of the institutions of a society. According to this school of thought, it 
is the institutions of a society that shape the incentive structure for its people to 
engage in productive activities and hence achieve economic prosperity. For 
them, geography does not explain economic performance once the effect of 
institutions is accounted for. Put simply, the geography school argues for a 
direct impact of geography on the economic performance of countries, whereas, 
the institutions schools argues that the impact of geography on income runs 
through its effect on institutions. 
In discussing the geography hypothesis, we divided this school into the 
classics and the contemporaries. The classical work focused attention on three 
aspects of geography: climate, geology and topography. The climate theories of 
growth assert that climate of a country shapes work habits and productivities of 
its people. Geology based theories emphasised role of soil fertility in shaping 
political and economic organisations of societies. Theories of hydraulic 
civilisations brought out importance of topography for development. 
Contemporary work in this area points out five major areas in which geography 
directly affects economic productivity—technological development, agriculture 
productivity, human health, transport costs, and proximity and ownership of 
natural resources. 
The Institutions School, however, contends that the enormous variations 
in incomes across countries are due to differences in institutions. Institutions 
define the incentive structure for a society so that individuals decide to invest in 
education, equipment and machineries, innovation and attain prosperity as a 
result of these endeavors. They claim that the rise of the Western World can 
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only be explained in terms of evolution of its institutions from inefficient to 
efficient ones which allowed individuals (and organisations) in search of profits 
to take advantage of economic opportunities. 
What can be said in conclusion? Does “geography determine” or 
“institutions matter”? The geography hypothesis identifies important correlates 
of economic development, but few points are worth mentioning. The geography 
hypothesis, in its simplest form, stresses a kind of determinism that is time-
invariant in its effect. That is, areas that were rich initially, owing to better 
geographic endowments, should be rich today. However, we witness that some 
of the new world economies (USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) 
surpassed the initially more prosperous areas of Asia and parts of Africa. 
Second, geography determinism suggests an upper bound on the development 
capacity of the region owing to its location. It fails to explain why Singapore, 
despite its ‘tropical location’, joined the league of prosperous temperate zone 
economies. If geography is destiny, then why do economic fortunes of North 
Korea and South Korea, which share similar geography, differ so much? 
Institutions matter. Existence and enforcement of property rights for a 
broad cross section of people; enforcement of contracts; rule of law, so that 
powerful elites are constrained from expropriating the property of other less 
powerful sections of the society; impartial and speedy dispensation of justice; 
honest and efficient governments are conditions that are necessary for protecting 
fruits of entrepreneurship without which development cannot proceed. 
Developing countries, like Pakistan, stand to gain a lot from investment in 
improving their institutional infrastructure. If Pakistan can improve the 
protection of private property against expropriation to the level of Singapore, its 
per capita income would increase manifolds nearing income levels in 
Singapore.83 “Recognising the importance of institutions in economic 
development… is the first step toward significant progress in jump-starting rapid 
growth in many areas of the world today” [Acemoglu (2003), p. 30]. 
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